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PREFACE
The projecting of future economic conditions as well as programs
providing bases for the policies of the government have, though with
varying degrees, been generally accepted as a necessity among all the
modern countries of the world today,
As we know, almost every country has its own economic plan to
develop its economic activities in the future. We may find out easi4y
that these economic plans (or projects) have a certain amount of general
significance and to some extent cowmon methodology. But, at the same
time, if we study and observe them carefully, we will also see the fact
that each economic plan has its own specific character and methodology
according to the special stage of economic growth of the country.
I think it is a very important fact that there are two aspects
one is general and the other is specific - in every economic plan, and
it is not only a theoretical problem but also a political problem to
recognize and to discriminate between these two aspects,
Many interesting studies concerning the econom'ic and political
development of so-called underdeveloped countries have been made by
the Center for International Studies, M.I.T. It is very regrettable,
however, that few works or projects concerned with economic development
in Japan have been done there, As is well-known, there have been some
economic plans (or projects) in Japan so far, and they would provide a
lot of stimulating facts for everyone concerned with the problems of
i1
economic development. The experience of economic planning in Japan
provides a tgpical example of the individuality of an economic plan in
a Imiddle-advanced' country, presenting a unique structure ard pattern
of economic development and with a complex of economic and non-economic
factors,
In this study, I will consider the problems of economic planning
in a Omiddle-advanced' country, discussing the latest economic plan, in
the making of which I myself participated, although these views which are
mentioned here are not official but quite personal.
"ON THE NEW IONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PLAN OF JAPAN"
-as a test of economic planning in a so-called
'middle-madvanced' country.
PART I. FRAMEWORK
I General Background of the Economic Plan of Japan
1. Background
The Japanese goverrnmnt announced "The New Long-Range Economic
Plan" on December, 17, 197, together with a statement in which it
promised to make sincere efforts toward the ftlfillment of the Plan.
The character of the Plan is something like a guidepost. 2  The
Plan pictured a desirable economic level and pattern which is to be
attained as of 1962, five years after 1957: e.g0 the gross national
product in 1962 will be 40 per cent more than that of 1956, the
consumption expenditure per capita should increase 38 per cent compared
to 1956, total exports should increase by 82 per cent from the actual
figures registered in 1956, and so forth.
The rate of economic growth is computed as 6.5 per cent per
annum from the computed-base-value for 1956. (This is not the actual
economic level in 1956, but a level computed by constructing a theoretical
trend line for the past six years which eliminates business-cycle
fluctuations as much as possible; I will refer to this later.) This
economic growth rate is approximately twice the rate of most Western
countries. Even the pre-war rate of economic growth in Japan, which
was high relative to international standards, was about 4 - 4o5 per
cent annually on the average. Although the rate of economic growth
from 19g5 to 1956 was 5 percent per annum, and as high as 9 per cent
2per annum during 1951-1956, this was due to the fact that this was
a period of recovery from the ravages of World War II.
The goals shown in the Plan, therefore, can be reached only by
the combined efforts of the government, business and the people. 3
Judging from the present state of the Japanese econozr, the
factors limiting economic growth are, (1) the balance of international
payments and (2) the rate of capital accumulation.
From this point of view, at first, the plan set the export target
as an increase in exports of 10 per cent per annum from 1956 to 1962,
or say 47 billion dollars in 1962. This means that the rate of increase
in exports has to be more than twice that of the future rate of the
world's export growth forecast by (EEC. From this point of view,
efforts to increase exports as well as to increase agricultural and
other domestic production are urgently requested in the Plan.
At the same time, the total investment required to maintain the
planned rate of economic growth and particularly to reinforce trans-
portation facilities and energy power sources will reach a very large
amount, say 29 per cent of GNP in 1962. In addition to this, if we
take into account a balance of payments surplus as a buffer for emergency,
this rate of capital formation will be 30 per cent of GNP. This rate
is relatively high compared with that of foreign countries which is
approximately 20 per cent. Even in post-war Japan, the only two years
in which the rate exceeded 30 per cent were in 1951, during the Korean
War boom, and in 1956 when an investment boom swept the country.,
3During the rest of the post-war period, the rate was around 25 to 28
per cent. As the stage of economic growth progresses from rehabilitation
to development, total investment becomes proportionally larger, that is,
the capital/output ratio rises. It will be such a difficult problem to
boost the nation's overall rate of capital accumulation to this level
that government, business as well as families are all requested to
increase capital accumulation.
Parallel with these two limiting factors for economic growth, there
is another serious problem which requires the enlargement of the economic
scale as much as possible. This is the pressure of population and more
particularly of the so-called working age population. The total population
of Japan is predicted to increase by O.8 percent per annum during the
next five years. This rate is considerably smaller than that not only
of past years but also of the international s.ndard. The serious fact
is, however, that the rate of increase of the working age population,
which includes men and women from the age of 15 to 59 seeking new
opportunities for employment will be the very high rate of 1.9 per cent
annually for the coming five years. The minimum rate of economic growth
must be roughly 6 per cent per annum at least to absorb this new labor
force under the same conditions as those of today. Moreover, there
still remains a considerable amount of disguised unemployment, now engaged
in agriculture and smallzand-imedium sized enterprises, under virtually
preindustrial conditions. Such being the case, employment policy has
been given first priority in the Plan, although it is estimated that
this rate of working age population increase will decline after 1965
and that the demand for skilled workers will apparently exceed the supply
in the near future, - In this context, the Plan alma at a high rate of
growth and, at the same time, proposes to improve conditions by non-
economic policies such as the minimum wags scale and the social security
system including unemployment insurance. 5
The three problems mentioned above, namely (1) balance of inter-
national payments,, (2) accu mlation of capital and (3) improvement of the
employment situation, are the fundamental points of the Plan, which, as
we show later, distinguish the plans of 'middle-advanced' countries from
those of both advanced and underdeveloped countries. This is one of
the reasons why I regard the plan as a measuring rod against which can
be tested the significance of economic plans in amiddle-advanced'
countries, though the word mniddle-advanced' sounds a little unscientific.
2. What does 'long-range' man?
The Plan is just a 'long-range' plan. It is not a long-run forecast
nor a short-range plan, covering the next five years.
'Long-range' has two meanings. On the one hand, the five years
involved in the Plan, 1958-1962 is regarded as part of a longer period,
which covers 10-20 years in the future. More specifically, the targets
set in the Plan are guideposts for 1962, but the path continues into
the more distant future. This is particularly true in the fields of
employment, power, transportation, agriculture, forestry and other
important natural resources. The long-range projection will provide
not only an outlook for economic development, but also some ideas con-
cerning political and economic co-operation with foreign countries.
On the other hand, a 'long-rangev plan sust be strictly distinguished
from a short-term plan. In the first place, the tools for making these
two plans are quite different from each other. For instance, the capital-
output ratio used recently as a tool for making long-range plans can never
be used in making short-term plans or forecasts, while such parameters as
the seasonal fluctuation index are not as important in 'long-range' plans
as in short-range ones. In the second place, the meaning of 'stabilisation'
used in long-range plans sometimes conflicts with that used in short-term
ones. For example , we often have to set aside the problem of arployment
in short-term projects to keep 'stabilization'.
Thus, the targets shown in the Plan are guideposts for 1962, and
practical annual projects have to be net up along the lines of the Plan.
3. Term of Stabilization
The Plan has set up a fundamental condition under which the targets
mentioned are to be attained. It is a stabilized equilibrium sustaining
the 6.5 per cent rate of economic growth during the planned years.
A rapid economic growth rate itself does not always indicate the
soundness of a nation's economy. The experience of Japan in 1956
illustrates the fatt that 'too rapid growth' even without prices rising
may destroy the international balance of payments and result in a serious
recession. Orowth without stabilization, although the two may not coincide
6does not mean 'development'.
The stabilized equilibrium of the Plan has three aspects'
(1) Terms of Equilibrium
These are, firstly, equilibrium between saving and investment to
stabilize the money value; secondly, balance of payments equilibrium,
6which is a limiting factor for economic growth, thirdly, equilibrium
among the industrial sectors peventing the appearance of bottle-necks;
and finally, equilibrium between the supply and demand:lbr labor. These
equilibria have to be maintained to minimise the influence of the
business cycle .
(2) Terms of Economic Structure
rhe equilibrium mentioned above has to be attained along the
elimination of a certain lack of balance in the industrial sectors.
This lack of balance is evident at present in the fields of employment,
production, consumption etc. A typical example is a curious co-existence
of small-and-vedium-scale (pre-industrial) and large (modern) enterprises
in many fields of production. In this context, modernization of enterprise,
improvement of productivity, full utilisation of natural resources, are
regarded as means for resolving these difficulties.
(3) Social Terms
There are many non-economic factors which are related to economic
growth in the Japanese economy. Without considering these non-economic
factors, it would be impossible to draw up an economic plan or Japan.
From a theoretical point of view, a certain amount of 'freedom' is
permissible in the industrial sector to achieve rapid economic growth,
but if this 'freedom' goes too far, the resulting social tensions and
disequilibria may themselves interrupt this growth.
The problem is very complicated. But, without considering these
factors, there would be no modern economic plan, especially in 'middle-
advancede and underdeveloped countries.
7Onto this stabilised equilibrium must be built such economic policies
as: the provision of more employment opportunities, the improvemnt of
living standards, the expansion of exports, the accinulation of capital,
the reinf"orcement of industry, the utilisation of d nbt1e natural
resourost and the improvement of international oo-operation.
II. Metliodology of Planning
1. The Failure of the Last Plan
The nethodology of planning in the case of the last economic plan,
"The Five 'ear Plan for Economic Self4upport" (1956) was presented as
follows:
(1) The GNP was estimated from the formula GNP a m(y 4-), where a
stands for out put per man in the base year, Y the ratio of the labor
force to the ptulation of working age, (N), and U the total number
of unemployed.
(2) The import total was estimated from the formula &.f where
I stands for impo: ts, for the ratio of imports to GNP.
(3) The Compositihn of National Expenditure was estimated from the
formula Yt ry e, wherelY stands for gross capital formation, for
the gross capital -ccfficient, and for the gross national product.
is then brokeu down into four components according to their relative
proportione (plant and equipment, increase in inventories, private
residersial housing and government investment).
'he remainder should be equal to personal consumption. This
perrnal consumption is checked independently by postulating a probable
re of change in the propensity to consume, defined as the ratio
8between personal consumption and national income distributed.
(4) These social accounts Sigures could be consistent with
mi dou1im combinations of industrial structures and individual
investment plans. Targets concerning these sectors are projected
by the method of 'trial-and-error' between these sectors and the
social accounts figures.
The methodology of the plan mentioned above was based to such
an extent on Dr. Gerhard Colm's Model,2 that it was called after the
Colm - Model. This model was originally an 'orientation' rather than
it was
an 'imperative' on,Astatic rather than dynamic, and it stressed the
expenditure rather than the production-side. The method of Colm
model seemed to be effective in advanced countries such as America
where the economic parameters used in the model are relatively stable.
It would be effective even for non-advanced countries in making their
patterns of development clear. Nevertheless, in the case of Japan,
it was not sufficient to apply this methodology without considering
special features of the Japanese economy which I shall call charac-
teristics of a 'middle-advanced' country, such as the great degree
of disguised unemployment, and the duality of economic structures,
much of which is related to so-called non-economic factors. In Japan,
the parameters used in the model were so unstable and so variable
that the divergence between the project and actual results were found,
by empirical testing, to be large, A further point is that the
statistical system necessary for such a theoretical framework is rela-
8tively weak in the se countries.
92. Model-building by MeasuIn an Optium Growth Rate
In view of the foregoing, a now method which has been considered
to conform with the present stage and pattern of economic growth in
Japan, has been used this time. The methodology may be named "model-.
building by measuring an optimum growth rate".9
This methodology started from the rough determination of an attainable
economic growth under a stabilised equilibrin, and continued with the
setting up of an economic structure corresponding to that growth, After
getting the economic scale as a whole, this structure was broken down
in detail by a trial-and-error method for testing each magnitude.
For setting out a roughly-estimated economic growth, two stages
were considered.
(1) At first, three different types of economic growth were assned.
Then the Plan determined economic structures corresponding to these
three growth rates by using empirical parameters. Then, these three
types of economic growth and structure were tested by an extensive exami-
nation as to whether or not the equilibrium conditions would be fulfilled.
(The equilibrium conditions are balances between total investment and
total savings, in the international payments accounts, and between the
supply and demand for labor.) Finally, judging from the scale and
composition of GNP and/or =16, each case was examined as to whether or
not a 'bottle-nmck' would be produced ikom a macro-economic point of
view such as the iron-and-steel industry, the fuel and power industry,
transportation facilities and agricultural production,
10
The threit growth rates assumed are t (1) a relatively low rate
which is near the average pre-war rate of growth. (2) a high rate
which corresponds approximately to the rapid development in recent
years and (3) an intermediate rate ranking between the two.
Now, after testing each growth rate by the above-mentioned criteria,
it iras concluded that, from the viewpoint of balance between investment
and savings calculated by using the marginal capital co-efficient and/or
the capital-output ratio (though these two have different conceptions,
their usefulness in this case is similar), there would be some savings
surplus in case (1) and some ivestment surplus in cases (2) and (3).
A savings (surplus) means deflation, whereas an investment (surplus)
means inflation; both are unfavorable factors to stable and continuous
grovth,
From the viewpoint of balance in the international payments accounts,
it was found to be impossible in case (3), because the demand for imported
goods would show a sudden and drastic increase resulting in a large
deficit. This deficit would be larger to higher the growth rate.
The relation between changes in the propensity to import and the rate
of export growth will determine the extent of imbalance in the inter-
national payment accounts. In any oase, so far as ,the foreign trade
0.'" in all1 tkuee cases.
postition ii concerned he loer rate of economic growth, the
better the balance.
From the viewpoint of employment, on the contrary, the higher the
rate of growth the better. The employment problem will get more serious
in the future than at present in case (1) showing 1'titamm between
demand and supply of labor, whereas the employment problem will be
greatly improved, even though not completely solved, in case (2).
11
Lastly, a 'bottle-neck' in the industrial sectors would not appear
ezept. 1 case (2).
Thus, at the first stage in selecting the optimum rate of growth,
it has become evident that, from the viewpoint of employment, it is
more desirable to set a rate close to or higher than (2), while from
the point of view of exports and investment the rate should be placed
near (1).
(2) In the second stage, the variability of the leading parameters
is examined and the probable effects of various political measures to
be taken for the attainment of the Plan are anticipated. This study
offers marn probable cases.
It was very difficult to choose one 'probability', because these
difficulties are inconsistent with each other, on the one hand, and
on the other hand, the selection Is a natter of government policy.
Thus, it was determined that the rate of 6.5 per cent is the optimum
rate of growth which can maintain the required conditions for equilibrium,
presuming the high effect of sustaining policies.
Now let us examine four phases of the Plan. There are four points;
(1) Production, which represents economic growth, by industrial sectors,
(2) The components of gross national expenditure, particularly investment
allocation, (3) Balance of international payments, the analysis of the
I/p ratio (propensity to imports; I stands for imports and P for production),
and the examination of the attainability of the export target in relation
to the rate of growth of international trade, and (4) balance of labor
forces, which includes some non-economic factors This examination should
12
be done not only by historical testing bit also by comparison with
advanced or/2ad under-developed countries as much as possible.
3. Prouation
The determination of the production level and its rate of growth
is considered in three sectors; namely, primary, secondary and tertiary
industries. There was some opposition to dividing NP into these three
sectors. For example, Prof. Woytinsky recommended the division of GNP
into tUo groups, modernised- and non.adrnised- Sectors.0 Such
suggestions for dividing PN into certain categories other than those
of Colin Clark Yeem very reasonable in the light of special characteristics
of the Japans econouy. However, from a statistical point of view,
which is a c6nolusive factor in building an economic model, the most
convenient division so far is Clark's.
The first step in the derivation of GNP is to get a trend curve
for pr An secondary industries.
In this case, the production 9f the problem is the number of terms
to be consideredU, the larger the better. The Plan tested some terli,
omitting the time of rehabilitation immediately after the war and, in
the case of the primary industries, adjusting the influence of seasonal
fluctuations.
Once the stabilized trend curves of production by industries are
determined they are adjusted to the Inorml condition' of the base year,
19560 This 'normal condition' is the co.-ordinate point for a certain yar
on the stable uard trend curve. This curve shows the normal trend of
economic activities, and the computed base value represents, so to speak,
13
the normal economic level in 1956, When we say base year or base value
for 1956, it mans the year which is on this curve, and, needless to say,
this very year is not an empirical but a theoretical year. The reason for
setting the computed base value thus, is to prevent the influences of short-
term business cycles or fluctuations from reflecting themselves in future
figures which may happen if actual figures in a particular year are used
as 'a base. In other words, the 'normal condition' is free from economic
fluctuations. This conception of 'normal condition' is a remarkable
character of the Plan and seems to be well applied to the plan for the
country, the economic development of which is influenced by business
cycles and fluctuations.
In the Plan, ONP in 1962 is planned to increase by 6.5 per "Ut
per annum starting from the base value or 'normal condition' in 1956.
The actual figure for GNP in 1956 stands approximately 1 per cent higher
than the computed base value ('normal condition') so that the rate of
growth for 1956-62 would be calculated as 5.85 per cent per annum.
Production income of the primary industries wil, increase at an
annual rate of 3.0 per cent over the base value. The Production index
of agriculture also shows a 3 per cent increase per annum, assuming no
decrease in the rate of n/g (where n stands for net and g for gross
production).
It is true that agricultural production is limited on the one hand,
by the law of diminishing returns which is counteracted to some extent
by technological progressand that is influenced on the other hand, br an
unpredictable 'seasonalt factor. But any error would not influence the
Japanese econoy as a whole as much as it would that of underdeveloped
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countries, where the production of primary industries has a powerful
influence on total economic activity.
The production curve of the secondary industries is presumnd to
increase by d0. per cent from 1956 to 1962, say 6.2 per cent per annum
as an optimum growth rateo The secondary sectors (mining and manufacturing
industries, contruction, transportation and communication, and public
utilities) will perform the major role among the three sectors.
It must be noted also that changes in economic- structure (in ths
secondary sectors) must be accompanied by intensive heavy-chemical.
industrialisation and the transfer of activity to the export-goods-
industries.
Of course, the extent and speed of this heavy-chemical-industriali-
sation and the transfer of activity to the export-industries must be
decided by certain criteria such as capital coefficients, the propensity
to energy conswnption, the propensity to import raw materials, and the
balance of enterprises by sise etc.
The lan proposes at first to develop the export-goods-industries,
which consist of two different types of industries, on the one hand, such
industries as the textile industry which holds a greater part of the
export trad and handicraft goods (miscellaneous good.) both being labor-
intensive industries, and on the other hand the heavy industries and
chemical. industries (especially machinery industry), which are regarded
as the most promising in the future, having adaptability to future marketss
labor absorbability and a low propensity to energy consumption., Parallel
with these industries the Plan lays emphasis on developing the iron and
15
steel industries which produce not only basic materials but also
expotable goods.
Thus, the output of heavy-haenmial-industries will increase 82
per cent during the planning term, while that of light industries will
increase only 36 per cent in the same term. Consequently, in terms of
the added value comparison between heavy-chemical-industries and light-
irdustries, the 59/1 ratio of 1956 will change to 66/3I.
The total demand of energy to sustain this industrial activity
will gmount to 160 million tons (in terms of 7,00 Cal. coal) by i962,
which means 56 per cent higher level than the level of 1956 (rate of
707 per cent per annum); while GNP will increase, as mentioned before,
by 41 per cent (say 5.85 per cent per annum). The overall propensity
to ensrgy consumption will increase as a result of heavy and chemical
iurustrialisation. In spite of efforts in mobilising domestic energy
sources, including some extent of power generation by atomic power, an
in spite of technical progress in energy efficiency, the rate of £Y/
will still go up from 23 per cent in 1956 to 33 per cent in 1962
(where E, stands for demand for imported energy - say coal and oil,
and E stands for total energy demand).
Once the target figures of the primary and secondary industries
(including transportation, communication and public, utilities) are
given, the figures for tertiary industries (commerce, services and
others) can be obtained by the formulas
t3= at'.(Y 
t
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where I, stand for the output of the primary, secondary and
tertiary industries respectively, and a and b are obtained from
empirical tests. As a result, the tertiary industries are expected
to increase at an annual rate of 7.2 per cent.
In this context, the change in the industrial composition ratio
between the basic year, 1956 and the final year 1962 can be described
as follows: in regard to the primary industries, it will decline from
19.1 per cent to 15.7, while the ratios in regard to the secondary and
tertiary industries will increase respectively from 41.8 per cent to
43.6 per cent and from 39.0 per cent to 40.7 per cent.
These changes man that the major force for economic growth in
the future will be secondary industries and that, following the growth
of the overall econowg, the tertiary industries wil also be developed.
These changes show the successive stages of economic growth; for
reference, the figures of several countries are calculated as followst
CoMnent of National Product by Industr (5)
Primary Ind. Secondary Ind. Terti
High in Primary: Pakistan 60 7 3
Secondary: Italy 28 41
t Frarce 29 46 2
: West Germany 1 56 3
Tertiary : Holland 14 12
A U.K. 5 47 4
: U.S. 6 38
Japan 1923-1927 28 30
1938-1942 21 38
1951-1955 23 31 Z
1956
1962 (Plan)
Adding the production of the various industries, the
.national production will reach 13042 billion yen(
in 1962, that is to say a rate of 6.5 per cent per annum.
ary Ind.
3
1
5
8
6
2
6
total gross
U.S. dollars)
x
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ThIs rate of economic growth (6.5 per cent) is relatively high
compared with the forecasted rate of growth in other countries, with
the excoption of certain socialistic countries,
46 OoseMnts of Gross National !|xperditure
The next problem is the components of gross national expenditure
corresponing to the grand national production mentioned above,
At fi-,t, the level of WNE (gross national expenditure) was
computed by estimating the investment recessary for the projected
economic groth, and by estimating the future savings considered possible.
This was nerely a tertative approach to get the figures for GNE,
Once, the rate 3f growth, say 6.5 per cent per annumn, is decided, GEL
is tqlaon to be cqual to the level of GNP in 1962. This ONE is composed
of gross consumpiton expenditure (personal consumption expenditure and
government outlay'., gross capital formation (investment in industrial
equipment, administrative investment, inventory increase or decrease and
personal housing cistruction) and the overseas surplus on current account.
Each item cf M1E is adjusted finally by the method of 'trial and
error', but beforeivnd, they are all examined tentatively by the following
procedures.
The figures for capital formation, which means investment allocation
in this case, war given first consideration. Gross, capital formation is
estimated on the basia of the formulat
&
where T stands fo. gross capital formation, 4 for the capital coefficient
(not exactly same o capital productivity, in this case it means the
capital/output r# io) and for gross national product. In this case,
18
the decision of parameter A is crucial. It is necessary to get
empirical figures concerning this capital-output ratio in the thre
(primar,eecondary, tertiary) industries by four groupst private equipment
investment, inventory increase, private house construction and admi-
nistrative investment.
By examining the actual data for 1951-1955, it became clear that
the capital-output ratio fluctuated from year to year, making it difficult
to get a stable parameter from it.
Needless to say, from the theoretical point of view, it is necessary
to examine one complete business cycle at least to get even tentative
magnitude, In case of Japan, moreover, it is also difficult to obtain
any business trend (whether cycle or not), because each decade has
quite a different character from that one before For instance the
first ten years after the end of World War II would be of special
magnitude because of rehabiaitation activity, and the same is true for
prewar periods and during the war when the economic structure was
changing. Forthermore, the statistics have not always been reliable.
Of course, our main intention is not to use a rigid conception of the
capital-output ratio, but to Judge roughly the possibility of equili-
brium between the investment required for the planned g nd the
savings estimated by trend analysis.
The capital-output ratios for the period of 1952-1955 are on the
average: primary industries 2.6, secondary industries 3.2, tertiary
industries 1.6, the three industries as a whole 2.4, and the admi-
nistrative sector 0.6, and finally the total economy 3.0 (each is
calculated by I/O , where ;, stands for gross capital formation
19
including investment for inventories, and 0 for the rat increasi
in gross national income for the sa= year.)
Although care must be taken in the use of these figures, it an
roughly be said that; (1) the average capital-output ratio is
approximately 3 in recent Japan0 (2) the highest ratio is that? for
the secondary industries, next is that for the primary industries and
the lowest is that for the tertiary sector. (3) the average rate of
economic growth over this period was 8.9 per cent, so from Domar formula,
the saving ratio can be computed as 24-27 per cent. (4) If we take
a longer period, although soe difficulties remain, we car podiaf
that the capital-output ratio will have a tendency to increase slightly.
There are two reasons why the capital-output ratio will rise
13
slightly in the near future in Japan. One concerns the pattern of
economic growth, namely a change in industrial structure. The
secondary industries which will be especially encouraged to expand
will expand relatively to the other sectors. This will raise the
capital output ratio, because the capital-output ratio of secondary
industries is the highest. However, since it is estimated in the Plar
that the tertiary industries will have a higher rate of growth than the
primary industries, we can counter-balance the influences on the capital
A ratio from the point of viiw of structural changes.
The second reason why the ratio has a tendency to go up is the
fact that capital demand for modernisation will increase more and more,
and
HeavyAchemical industrialization, without considering technical progress,
has a tendency to raise the capital--output ratio. Generally speaking,
20
in this case, the extent of change in the ratio will depend upon the
speed of economic growth, technical progress, and operation degree.
The experience of 1956 in Japan serves as a typical example- of the
faot that too high a rate of economic growth has a tendency to raise
the capital-output ratio, causing bottlenecks in soe industries.1
In arv case, it is important (1) not to overestimate a (which
stands for the marginal increase of the capital-output ratio between
actual-present and projected-future), and (2) not to emphasize too
muac the role of this parameter in economic model-building, because
there remain un-resolved questions both in using the concept of capital-
output ratio theoretically, and in the reliability of the statistics.1
Thus, total capital formation is expected to reach 3782 billion
Yen ( dollarv), say 29 per cent of gross national expenditure,
Of this, plant and equipment investment will amount to 2778 billion
Yen ( dollars), say 21.3 per cent of gross national expenditure
(2100 billion Yen for industrial investment and 67.8 billion Yen for
administrative investment). Ih these investment considerations,
investment in the secondary industries, and above all in heavyWemical
industries must have priority.
Investment for inventory is calculated by using the marginal capital
co-efficient, and the result shows a lower rate of growth. Investment
for private house construction is calculated with reference to gross
national production. The ratio of that investment to gross national
expenditure will go on rising gradually,
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The remainder of the gross national expenditure should be equal
to the sum of personal consumption and the overseas surplus on current
account, In the Plan, the latter is assumed to bit the same proportion
as in the basic year 1955, when the balance was slightly positive.
The rest therefore is personal consumption, which should reach 7788
billion Yen by 1962 and cover about 60 per cent of total gross national
expenditure. This consumption rate is very low, something which in the
post-war period only appeaaedin 1956, when investment reached to
abnormally high levels. This low rate of consumption, of course,
corresponds to a high rate of capital formation.
Government consumption is assumed to be 1239 billion Yen say
9;5 per cent of total gross national expenditure, entailing a decrease
in tax ,and a reduction in the government budget.
Consequently, personal consumption is expected to increase by 45
per cent by 1962 compared with 1956, (consumption per capita will
increase- by 38 per cent), and, together wAith this growth in consumption
the structure of consumption is assumed to change gradually. Each
item making up personal consumption is estimated using the concept of
incom-elasticity. The result is that the ratio of expenditure on food
as against total consumption expenditure (that is to say the Enges-
coefficient) will decrease, while that of education, housing, durable-
consumer goods, and clothing will increase. The propensity to consume
differs also between urban and farm districts. (The disposable income-
elasticity of consumption is assumed to be 0.785 in urban, and 0.939
in farm household.) It should be noted here that these figures are
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'aggregated', and that patterns of growth will be quite different for
different brackets.
The figures for consumption shownin gross personal consumption
expenditure are supported by the cowmodity4budget which approaches the
problem from the materials side in another part of the Plan. Thus
total personal consumption is calculated by deducting total capital
formation from total gross national expeoditure, but it is also checked
independently by estimating the propensity to consume (consumption
rate, where stands for personal consumption expenditure and
Er for personal disposable incoms), the trend of capital consumption
allowances and indirect business taxes (minus subsidies).
The result is that the marginal propensity to save will be maintained
at a level of 30 per cent or more. These estimates are of course collated
with the figures mentioned above.
This pattern of gross national expenditure, that is to say a high
ratio of investment and a low ratio of consumption, requires much more
effort to save on the part of the people, though there will be special
circumstances tending toward a high saving ratio due to more or less
non-economic factors (which I am going to refer to soon), such as the
incompleteness of the social guarantee system and the unimproved situation
of housing which have compelled the consumer to save.
However, since it is hard to secure Icapital', say to save 3996
billion Yen (over 30 per cent of total ONE), it is expected in the Plan
to increase capital consumption allowances by taking effective depreciation
for enterprises and to increase undistributed profits and personal
saving by tax-deductions, together with a certain rationalization of
the way of living,
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This equilibrium of saving and investment is described in the Plan
as gaverage' or 'aggregate'; therefore to carry out the Plan, a short-
term practical plan determining activity by sectors or by income brackets
is necessary to adjust the Plan and to minimise the influences of business
flustuations.
5. Internationa Balance of Pampnts
The next problem is the problem of the international balance of
payments, which is where the domestic econong encounters external
influences. Here, the important considerations are the propensity to
import and the attainability of export targets.
Before setting up import-export projects, certain factors in
the international or domestic situation must be assumed. These premises
are as follows in the Plan.
(1) World trade will increase by 4 to 5 per cent annually for
the next few years, though the speed of expansion of production is
expected to slow down subsequently.
(2) The problems of the restoration of currency convertibility-and
the improvement of the dollar position will still remain with regard
to the certain markets and countries, but there will be no need to
keep too close an eye on the currency-wby-currency balance.
(3) Although one carmot ignore the danger of discrimination inherent
in the regionalism of world trade with its restrictions and control
policies, particularly in Europe, the 'terling-area, Central and South
America and the Communist area, international trade will proceed gradually
in the direction of greater freedom,
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(k) The proportion of trade within the Coumunist bloc relative to the
total volume of world trade will diminish gradually, and East-West
trade will increase. (So, the present restrictions on Japan's trade
with Communist China and the Soviet Union will be greatly alleviated.)
(5) The United states' foreign aid policy will not change radically and
there will be no marked reduction in the amount of its foreign aid.
(Japangs special procurement revenue will gradually decrease but some
will remain, mainly in the form of the International Cooperation Agency
(I.C.A) purchases).
(6) Southeast Asian countries which are now suffering from stagnation
and monoculture will gradually improve their economic conditions as
their economic development programs proceed. It is also expected
that the economic and political relations (including the problem of
reparation) between these countries and Japan will be normalised
completely in the plan period.
The different points in the above discussion agree on one point,
namely that the export-import plan must be based on the equilibrium
not only of domestic situation but also of the international position,
based on the recognition of the fact that the Japanese economsy is
typically influenced by the world economy.
In drawing up the import-export plang b MaM *tart wit.fithtr
kjha2 my ,6 a the impart side. The former method seems suitable for
the Japanese economy from the above-mentioned considerations, and it
also looks reasonable from the empirical divergence between the
projected and the actual figures. In fact, there are al.eady some
economic plans or projections which start from an estimate of exports
3,
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figures, such as that for the Netherlands.
This method was not followed, however, because of the difficulties
in estimating the, future exports of Japan.
(1) The export industry of Japan is in the position of a marginal
supplier, and (2) even if some reasonable estimate could be made, there
still remain the difficulties of calculating the multiplier effect of
exports, aggravated by the incompleteness and instability of such
statistics as those obtained from the input-output analysis table in
Japan.16
In this Plan, therefore, the imports necessary to maintain the planned
growth rate, were estimated first, although the method of trial-and-error
was adopted at the final stage of planning. Then, the question of whether
it would be possible to export enough to balance the estimated amount
of imports was considered.
Import demand for principal materials such as iron-ore, coal, crude
oil, salt for industrial use, raw wool, pulp, rice, soya beans are
calculated by the formula:
where I stands for import demand, P for production (in real terms),
gt for material-consumption-per-unit, D for domestic supply, /A for
the normal rate of inventory. In the plan, 6 is assumed to decrease
to some extent with technical progress, and 4s is assumed constant at
the level of base year except for certain goods.
The quantities of these imports goods estimated by the method
metioned above, cover more than 60 per cent of total imports. The
other import consdities are divided into four categories, and their
demand is estimated on the basis of correlations with close indicest
namely, (1) foods and beverages with the real personal consumption
irmax , (2) raw materials with industrial activity indices, (3) finished
production goods with mining-industrial output indices, (4) finished
consumption goods with the total scale of imports. These furn tional
formulae were obtained from empirical studies.
The aggregated figure is tested in two ways: first from the
viewpoint of 2propensity to import and second from a break-down
into a detailed comuodity budget.
Needless to say, ary level of gross national production implies
a certain level of imports. Generally speaking, the propensity to
import in Japan has been assumed to be a fairly stable function, because
the major portion of imports consists of industrial raw materials and
staple food items. The question however remains as to how stable this
parameter really is,
In the ?tan, the propensity to import is calculated at 16.2 per
cent (value of import/national income) which shows a slight decrease
from the 1956 figure of 16.9 per cent, Roughly speaking, there are two
opinions about the future tendency of this propensity; one considered
that this figure should decrease in the future because of increases in
domestic agricultural production, which will utilize domestic materials
as import substitutes in the manufacturing industry, and will increase
productivity (using less importeA raw materials per product by techno-
logical progress). This aspect has been used to explain the divergence
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between the pwanar propensity to import and the postwar one.
The other opinion states the exact reverse, namely it considers
that this propensity should increase, because of the poorness of domestic
industrial materials. It emphasises the limit of natural resources,
taking the recent tendency of the parameter as an example.
The truth is, I think, that the propensity to import depends not
only on the level of GNP (or industrial activities) but also on the
rate of ecommic growth (change in GNP?) We have to calculate this
propensity to be higher (or lower) as the rate of economic growth is
considered to be higher (or lower). l
The factors necessitating this emphasis on the rate of economic
growth are (1) the time-lag between demand and supply of raw materials,
which sometimes causes an inflational gap or the appearance of bottlea.
necks, and (2) changeability of inventory.
The propensity to 2iport is estimated at approximately 16.2 per
cent as mentioned above, and this estimate seems to be reasonable in
the light of the following facts:
(1) There will be a high rate of growth in the machinery and chemical
industries, both with a high degree of round-about production (lower
propensity to import).
(2) There will also be a relatively high rate of growth in the tertiary
industries the propensity to import of which is low.
(3) The marginal propensity to import under the stable economic growth
will be stable and almost equal to the average propensity to import,
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Frou the viewpoint of import structure, the changes can be seen
as follows, reflecting the policies outlined above; (1) The import
dependeno (import demand/total demand) of salt, steel-scrap, pulp,
ordinary finished steel, rubber will decrease with increasing domestic
production and substitution of domestic goods. A typical example is
the case of textiles: the ratio of production between natural and
artificial fibres for 1962 is put at 58142 against the 1956 ratio of
69:31 (The import dependence of natural fibres, i.e. raw cotton and
raw wool is 100 per cent, while that of artificial fibres are
negligible). (2) The import dependence in mineral fuel and finished
products for material use will increase. The increase in the former
(166 per cent increase during 1956-1962) is due to the low production
in the dcmestic energy sectors, and the ratio of imported energy source-
to the total energy supply wilise from the 1956 level of 23 per cent
to 33 per cent in 1962. The increase in the latter item is figured out
in the light of the international division-of-labor and the liberalisation
of the world trade. (3) The import demand for consumer goods will keep
the same proportion to total imports as at present,
The structure of imports would change in the direction of the
"western pattern". The percentage distribution of imports by groups
is as follows:
1956 1962
Raw Materials 55.8% 50,6%
Mineral Fuels 13.1 16.2
Finished Product Goods 13.6 16.9
Others 2.7 2.6
Tetal 100.0 100.0
This pattern also corresponds to the market pattern.
28
Once the import projects are given, the exports targets must be
set.
In order to keep equilibrium in the balance of payments, exports
must increase at a rate higher than the increase in imports. In other
words, exports must cover not only the increase in Imports but also
the deficit which results from decreases in special procurement
In addition, a certain amount of foreign exchange accumlation for
operative purposes is nacessary to keep pace with the increased volume
of trade.
Although the structure of industry is becoming more industrialised,
the exports of Japan have a "duality". This is that the exports of Japan
consist of two groupsg The 'labor-intensive goods' or some special
products which are exported to advanced countries, and the 'capital-
intensive goods0 which are exported to underdeveloped countries, espe-
cially to South-East Asian countries, This duality in Japanese exports
which comes from the duality in economic growth is one of the most
typical characteristics of 'middle-advanced 0 countries, and this
situation will continue in the coming period. This course seems natural
and reasonable. The advantage of labor-intensive goods is evident from
the fact that there is relatively abundant labor available in comparison
with capital, and it should be utilised in the international division of
labor, in view of the continuing supply of new labor. The advantages of
the export of capital-goods to underdeveloped countries comes from the
divergence of industrialisation. The labor-intensive goods in this case,
are foodstuffs, beverages, raw silk, yarn, clothes, sewing machines,
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and
cameras, toyVf etc.; the capital intensive goods are medical and
chemical products, instal products, artificial fibres, machinei, etc.
Heavy industry and chemical industrialisation is taken into consi-
deration in the light of the advantages of 'the duality of exports' and
of Japan's location, and the structure of the export market will change
with changes in comodities,
The exports' target has been settled both from the standpoint of
merchariise composition and that of market structure, ard the result is
that exports must total T730 million (on a customs clearance basis),
an 82 'per cent increase over the 1956 figure, or a 10.5 per cent annual
increase. This target is high, Is it a possible one? The answer is
prepared by a breakdown of exports by commodities and tr markets. But,
let us first examine the possibility in the light of the relation between
Japanese exports and world trade. The target is certainly high; the
rate of exports increase in the Plan, say 10.5 per cent per annum, is
more than twice as high as the anticipated growth rate of world trade,
approximately 4,.5 per cent. But according to the statistical studies,
the growth rate of exports in Japan was 17.4 per cent per annum from
195%-1955, while that of world trade was 6 per cent per annum over the
same period. The Japanese rate of growth was nearly three time that
of world trade. This divergence was largely due, undeniably, to the
fact that Japan's exports emerged from the rock bottom of fatigue., But
the gap between the rate of Japanese exports growth and that of world
trade will still remain, in view of the stage of Japan's economic growth.
For reference, the ratio of Japanese exports to world total was as
low as 2o7 per cent in 1956 as compared to 5 per cent in 1937,
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Of course, though this target seems possible, its fulfillunt
cannot be certain. Other world tiede factors must be carefully studied,
such as bloc-ism (not only between West and East but also by currency
aree ), discrimination, liberalization and so forth. Moreover, iits
realization depends on the trade policy to be carried out together with
the effective industrial policy followd in mWdernisation, obilisation,
in the sphere of domestic and international equilibrium and the ' -
international division of labor. In this context, the Plan stresses
also such policies as advancing economic diplomacy, enhancing economic
cooperation, securing export markets, improving the ~trade system, sim-
plifying and rationalizing trade and exchange regulations, improving
the finance, insurance and tax systems, nutturing and strengthening the
export industries and the stabilization of prices, improving invisible
trade policy, etc.
In relation to export-import projects, there are two factors to be
taken 'led account; one is the accumulation of foreign exchange, and
the other is the development of investment abroad.
The foreign exchange holdings in 1956 were small. It is necessary
to accumulate more foreign exchange not only to supplement the shortage,
but also to meet increasing demand for inventory. In the Plan, the
optiaum holding level is assumed to be 20-30 per cent of total imports,
which is considered reasonable by the recommendation of United NationsO
authorities and by comparison with empirical cases in Western countries.
In this context, a surplus of approximately 200 million dollars in the
exchange balance is expected to accumulate per annum, showing a surplus
of 150 million in 1962.
31
Furthermore, these accmulated foreign exchazge holdings my be
used as a 'buffer' to modify the influences of short-term business
fluctuations. This is one of the typical measures to maintain stable
economic growth.
Finally, in the trade plan, there is $300 million for overseas
investment. The purpose of this kind of investment is to encourage
exports and to secure imports, especially with South-East Asia. They
include not only monstary credits but also various kinds of grant.
6. EmploMent
It is one of the main targets of an economic policy to Chi.eve a
situation of full-employment in every country. The way to achieve
this aim, however, differs from one country to another according to
the stage of economic growth.
In the advanced countries, 'full-euployment 'conditions are regarded
as established when r-auployment is between 3 and 5 per cent. In these
countries, where the proportion of paid-laborers is more than 80 per
cent of the working population, and where no great difference in pro-
ductivity exists among the different industrial sectors, employment
policy is mainly a question of preventing unemployment exceeding this
limit.
In% from such advanced countries, Japan has a sharp divergence
between modern and pre-condition industries, making up a heterogeneous
industrial structure, with numerous family workers and self-established
small enterprises (or self-employed), as well as paid laborers whose
number accounts for no more than 40 per cent of the total working
population,
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This curious co-existene between modern and pre-condition industries,
having amounts of disguised unemployment with low productivity and low
income, is a typical feature of Japan which distinguishes it from
advanced countries, Under such circumstances, can a Western type of
employment policy, which regards a high rate of economic growth as the
supreme target be adopted? The answer is no. The principles of the
employment plan should be as follows:
(1) to provide normal employment opportunities for the new additions to
the labor force,
In Japan, the growth rate of total population will remain at 0,8
per cent annually or more, though the increasing tendency is now
lesse ing, with the declining birth rate and increasing life expectany
in the coming ten years, But, more important is the fact that the
working age population (aged 15-59) is forecast to grow at the rate of
1.9 per cent annually. The number of young people who become 25 years
of age during this period is estimated to be 1,43o thousands, or 1910
thousands annually, an increase of 12 per cent over the annual average
of 1710 thousands during 1950-1955. This tendency -i estimated to
continue until at least 1965, and the peak of the increas.ng curve
of the working age population will appear during the planned period,
This means that, on the one hand, the pressure of population is
stronger than it seems and, on the other hand, the average ages of
laborers will shift upwards several years after the planned -period.
This is the reason why the all possible provision of employment
opportunities is required.
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(2) 2o modernize the structure of employment.
The problem mentioned in the above paragraph, is rather the problem
of population than the problem of employment. In the case of Japan, the
two problems must be strictly distinguished both from the theoretical
and the practical point of view. The crux is to the quaLIty' s well
as the equantity2 of employment opportunitioc.
As is often pointed out, the employment situation of Japan has
a special character. Although the ratio of those engaged in the rimary
industries to the total working population decreased from 49.4 per cent
to 41.1 per cent during the years 1930-1955, and the percentage of paid-
laborers among the total employment rose during the same period from
32.3 per cent to 45.5 per cent, the employment structure still remains,
in a low stage of economic development. There exist deep-rootedly pre-
conditioned sectors and pre-modernised characteristics of employment.
Because of these features, a method semi-macro analysis as well
as macro analysis is adopted in the Plan. The total employment is
divided, on the one hand, into the primary, secondary, tertiary sectors
and, on the other hand, into self -employed, paid laborers and family
worklers. This method seems reasonable in the case of Japan from the
empirical fact that the fluctuations of the employment curve are very
different by sector, and the fluctuations in the participation-rate is
due mainly to the fluctuations in the 'fri nge or secondary workers',
(3) To increase income per capita by improving productivity and raising
the production level.
This principle, of course, is related to (1) and (2). As far as
employment fields are concerned, the low level of income causes two
phenomena: one is the low level of wages as a consequence of low
living standards and the other is the existence of disguised unemployment.
From a theoretical point of view, the low level of wages has para-
doxical economic interest. It is that, if wages are low labor-intensive
industries would be advantageous industries to compete in foreign markets,
but at the same time, low levels of income would obstruct the adoption of
modernized equipment and production methods which would improve producti-
vity. One of the difficulties in employment policy is how to resolve
this paradntical proposition. Further, this problem must be faced with
other problems: (1) the average income level of workers should be
raised to improve their standard of living by increasing productivity,
and (2) the improvement of productivity may possibly worsen the employment
and
situation, The expansion of the heavy'chemioil industries means that
the structure of industry with shift from being labor-intensive to being
capital intensive, and this poses the question of whether a continuous
high rate of growth will remove the 'dualityt of the Japanese economy
or whether the expansion of the heavy and chemical industries will
aggravate it.
"Disguised unemployment" is one of the typical features of the
Japanese employment situation, and it keeps the level of wages relatively
low, Without tackling this problem, there would be no good employment
policy. There are several definitions of "disguised unemployment.' For
instance, the Unemployment Counter-measure Advisory Council estimated
the number to be 5,760 thousands (in 1954) from income levels, while the
Ministry of Labor, placing the stress on the consciousness of the occupants
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calculates the number of the once employed but urgently in need of
improvement of their employment condition and of those who have never
been employed befbre, looking for employment urgently, to be 2780
thousands (in 1956).
Anyhow, no one can dey the existence of disguised unemployment.
It is divisible into two groups; one is found in the employment in
pre-modern status of employment, and the other concealed among the modern
type of paid-workers. In order to improve the situation the amount of
pre-modern employment must be decreased by promoting the modernisation
of the industrial as well as the employment structure, and also the
number of low-waged laborers even among the mod-rnised sectors must
be decreased not only by economic growth but also by political measures
such as the minimum-wage system, unemployment insurance and so forth.
Considering these special features, the Plan calculated the targets
by using semi-macro analysis. In the former economic plan in 1955, the
formula GNP mm (Ywas adopted as the basic formula. (As we mentioned
before, here rm stands for output per man, X the labor ratio of labor force
rate to the working ages population N and U for the total number of
unemployed). But in the case of Japan, the figures for /m have
less meaning than in the case of advanced countries which makes this an nu.-
suitable formula on which to base an economic plan on Japan, 18
Examining by sectors (the primary, secondary and tertiary industrise)
and by status (self-employed, paid-laborers and family workers )
i he Plan calculated the targets as follows:
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(1) to realise a not increase of 4980 thousand employees and 330
thousand self-established during 1957--1962. This increase means that
the jobs freed by retiremsnt are taken into consideration, a greater
percentage of school graduates will be absorbed into employment than
before. In other words, 70 per cent of male graduates and 65 per cent
of female graduates (who reach 15 years of age in this period and want
jobs unless they go into advanced studies) will be employed. According
to present statistics, most of the new school graduates have been
employed as paid laborers, started to work themselves, or been engaged
as family workers, and only a small part remained as non-labor force
population. Thus, the new labor force for the self-established or
the family workers will becom smaller than the number necessary for
maintaining the present levels, This means the modernization of
employment structure.
(2) By sectors, this will mean an increase of 1,776 thousands in the
secondary industri.es, and 3210 thousands in the tertiary industries, and
lay-off in the primary industries. This also means the modernization of
employment structure and, as a result, the ratios of employment by
sectors will vary as follotrs:
1956 1962
Primary industry 40.7% 35.7%
Secondary" 28.7 29.9
Tertiary n 306 34.
Total 100.0 100.0
(3) Consequntly, the rate of the workers per capita income growth
37
calculated from the growth rate of the above total number of employed
and of the national income will be 4,.4 per cent per annum.
(4) Of course, these targets are expected to be carried out with the
help of various kinds of employment policy, including non-economic
policies.
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III. sc0 coinE
1. Characteristics of an 2conomic Plan In 'Middle-Advanced' Countries
As we have seen so far, the new economic Plan in Japan has a
typical character which neither advanced nor underdeveloped countries
possess-.
Roughly speaking, we can group the economic plans (though remains
19the theoretical question in, the .r definition ) of various countries
into four groups; (1) advanced countries, (2) underdeveloped countries,
20(3) socialistic countries, and (4) middle-advanced countries.
I will not refer in detail to plans in socialistic countries
because of the differences in their economic system, their principles
of economic movements, their patterns of economic growth. Let as
limit the problem to so-called non-socialistic countries .21
First, I shall consider the economic plans in advanced countries.
In this case, the word 'plan* is used in its weakest meaning. The
United States makes its economic project by the "Employment Act (1943)"
annually. Besides this project, there are a few projects such as
Coin's 'American EconoW in 1960* and the Parry Commission's Report
which forecast future economic growth. In the United Kingdom, there
is also an annual (infml) project. which worked out at the time of
the budget and, beside this, there is some project under the 'Dis-
tribution of Industry Act.* In France, there have been the first,
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second (Irsh), and third Monet Plans which aimed at the modernization
of industry.
The features of these plans in advanced countries can be roughly
summarized as follows:
(1) The stage of economic growth in these countries has already at-
tained a high level based on the free-enterprise system.
(2) The main criterion of planning is the regulation of indigenous
die-equi libria.
(3) Another criterion may be to sustain special sectors of industry
(such as atomic-industry) or to enforce a- basic key-industry which
competes in foreign markets.
(4) Generally speaking, the importance of long-range planning is less
than that of short-range policies. In recent years, short-range eco-
nomic policies have come to have more *planned' features. Annual
projects are worked out in U.K., Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
and so on, which are rather guide-posts to regulate economic activity
or business fluctuations than intentions to change the structure of
the econoay.
(5) Finally, although the procedure of making these plans differs
from country to country, generally speaking, they are rather informal
and their methodologies are not always purely theoretical except in
individual fields.
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The economic plan in underdeveloped countries has contrasting
features. As often indicated, the economic plans in countries like
India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iran, Afganistan,
Vietnam, and many countries of South and Middle America, have common
features as follows:
(1) The government has a highly positive role in making and carrying
out the plan. The extent of government control over enterprises is
sometimes very high because of the undeveloped character of the mone-
tary system.
(2) In most cases, the plan has the characteristic of being a
"development * plan.
(3) Besides purely economic policies, they include many non-economic
policies to help promote the plan, such as land reformation and educa-
tion and welfare programs.
(4) As for the economic models themselves, their weak point is in
their capital formation plans which depend more or less on foreign
aid.
(3) These plans, strongly supported by government, look like very
much those of socialistic countries, but, of course, they are different
not only from a theoretical point of view but also in practice.
(6) Finally, the effect of these plans are influenced to a great ex-
tent by non-economic factors such as the weather (it has a powerful
effect on primary industry which is the main industry in these countries)
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and the international political situation. (Their budget-revenue comes
mainly from the customs duty for their mono-crop exports.)
Needless to say, this brief discussion is oversimplified; but,
at any rate, they possess in general the common characters just sum-
marized.
In contrast with the plans in advanced and underdeveloped coun-
tries, the economic plan as well as the national economy of some
countries has quite different characteristics. It seems to me bet-
ter to make up another category, 'middle-advanced countries' for them.
Japan and Italy would be typical examples of middle-advanced
countries, though the stages and backgrounds of these two countries
are quite different from each other.
We can specify the common problems in these middle-advanced
countries, as far as economic plans and their background are con-
cerned as follows:
(1) The per capita income of these countries is the median of the
per capita income rate of all countries, though this is merely one
(and not a very important one here) of the criteria. The targets for
per capita income in the plans are, of course, the higher the better.
(2) The main point is in the 'duality' of their economic structure.
Certain parts of the secondary industries have reached as high a level
as any in the world (not only technologically but also in equipment),
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while pre-condition factors (chiefly in agriculture and in small- and
medium-sized enterprises) remain and are still deep-rooted. It be-
comes, therefore, one of the keypoints of any economic plan to adjust
these two opposite extremes,
(3) The divergence in income levels is very large, and this, together
with other factors, causes the existence of much disguised unemploy-
ment. As a result, non-economic factors (such as social structure)
have to be carefully considered, and semi-macro analysis undertaken.
(4) The problem of the international balance of payments is one of
the most serious points to be considered in economic plans for these
countries, although the reasons for this are different from those
mentioned in the context of underdeveloped countries. Domestic
equilibrium can be obtained with international equilibrium.
(5) The importance the role of the government and foreign aid in
carrying out the plan is still great, though not so great as in the
case of underdeveloped countries.
(6) While the plans in advanced countries are "stabilization' plans
and those of underdeveloped countries are *development' plans, the
plans of middle-advanced countries have to have both characteristics.
This is due to the incompleteness- of take-off which forced the economic
growth to be continuous but unstable.
I do not wish to discuss here the plans of advanced or under-
developed countries. I only wish to point out that there are many
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types of economic plans (or projects, etc.) and that all of them have
their own specific historical background. Theoretically speaking, an
economic plan has its own method and features which are determined by
the different stages of economic growth. This is true even when we
limit the problem to Japan; the methodology of Japanese economic plans
has been varied from time to time according to its political situtation
and the stage of economic growth achieved.
I have pointed out three types of planning here to show that the
purpose of planning, the methodology of model-building and the way of
carrying out the plan should correspond to the stage of economic
growth and the special features of the countries concerned.
Therefore, if any mistakes are made in judging 'the stages' or
features of economic growth, the plan will be meaningless and will
have miserable results, however scientific the methodology may seem
to be or its targets attained in some fields. The faults of the former
economic plan make it a typical example of this case. 22
The methodology of the new Plan has many features becoming to
its national economy relevant to Japan's economw, as we have already
seen, even though the way of model-building itself is not yet fully
statistically-strengthened, or theoretically tested. For example, it
would seem to be more or less untheoretical to adopt such a method as
the so-called 'measuring opitimm growth rate,' especially when we
compare it with other models such as that used in the former plan
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which model was built on Western lines.
But if one studies the Japanese economy carefully, it will be
clear that it has too many 'exceptions' for the direct application
of the methods or conceptions derived from studies of advanced and/or
underdeveloped countries. Of course, this by no means denies the use-
fulness of precepts which foreign experience has taught, but it does
suggest that there mist still be 'particularity ' as well as Igenerality.
2. What is the Key for Planning?
I am going to deal in this section with the problems of the
criteria of policies and the allocation of investment
During the war and the period of rehabilitation from war-damage,
the national economy was carried on with a certain kind of economic plan.
These economic plans were certainly effective at that time: the
government was given the power of mobilizing and allocating the labor
force, investment, natural resources, foodstuffs, industrial and con-
sumer products and even power over the price-mechanism including wage-
control.
These factors, briefly speaking, 'a power of mobilization,' were
certainly most powerful measures to lead the-national economy toward
its targets.
Today, practically no country except some underdeveloped countries
(excluding all socialistic countries) has such power of mobilization.
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It contradicts the principles of free-system enterprise. Particularly,
any control over the flow of materials, or price-control including wage
control is inconsistent with a capitalist system. The only measure
left in the hands of capitalist governments is the allocation of in-
vestment. Moreover, this measure covers only some of the national
economy, and is not always as strong as it can be in socialist countries.
What is worse, "the nostalgia for the Invisible Hand" disturbs this
measure now and then, whereas this Invisible Hand can do nothing but
delay continuous economic growth.
The maximum growth and stability of the economy is thought by the
classical school to be achieved through the following stages or eqi-
libria, as Professor Rosenstein-Rodan has pointed out:2 3
(1) the allocation of a given stock of consumers' goods, (2) the al-
location of production on the assumption of a given stock of equipment,
land, and labor, (3) the allocation of investment on the assumption of
a given stock of labor, land, and capital, (4) a fourth equilibrium
condition, the assumption of Say's law.
But the functions which perform as decision factors for these
equilibria (for example, the working of the price mechanism) are more
or less interrupted by economic growth itself. The measures to be
applied in executing the economic plan depend on the extent to which
these functions can progress without contradicting the national economic
activity as a whole.
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For example, in the countries where the equilibrium of distribu-
tion can be achieved well through the price mechanism, it will not be
necessary to adopt such measures as price control or the allocation of
foods, materials, or consumer goods, but, on the contrary, in the
countries where the price mechanism does not work well, some arti-
ficial measures must be taken to help the Invisible Hand, however it
may seem to violate the principle of free-enterprise.
In advanced and inddle-advanced countries, the price mechanism
works relatively well given the proper lead by monetary and commercial
bodies, so that there is little need to adopt direct control, except
in some fielos like export-import trade. Usually, even these controls
are used only to make investment allocation (to which I shall soon re-
fer) effective.
There is no guarantee, however, that equilibrium between (1) total
consumption and total production, (2) production and investment, and
(3) investment and capital formation will be attained by the 'Invisible
Hand.' There remains a sphere where human control has to achieve an
important role: the problem of investment allocation. The main
measures used to make such allocation effective are, direct government,
the actions of government as a consumer, tight-or-loose money policies
of the Central Bank, the tax-system, subsidies, customs, duties, foreign
exchange regulation, and so forth.
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Since the Japanese economy is greatly influenced by the inter-
national situation, and since the propensity both to import and to
export is very high in Japan, export-import control as one of the
foreign exchange policies would be, ideally, one of the main spheres
of government activity. But, unfortunately, the greater part of the
activities in the export-import field cannot be controlled by the
Japanese gcvernment alone. Consequently, the control over this field
must assume a rather passive character and cannot be a top-level policy
in achieving the economic plan. However, the role of exports and im-
ports is, needless to say, so important that we take account of the
problem of the Ullocation of investment ' including the problem of
capitalformation, the control over the import-export field is always
considered as one aspect of the investment program, though it is pas-
sive. 24
Why can the problem of equilibrium among consumption, production,
investment, and capital formation, which we can summarize as the prob-
lem of 'optimum allocation of investment,' not be left to the Invis-
ible Hand? The answer is:
(1) The relative shortage of capital supply compared with demand. In
general it can be said that the higher the rate of economic growth re-
quired, thb more capital is needed. However, capital shortage, in
this sense, has become increasingly less significant in recent Japan.
The importance of the allocation of investment is rather a matter
48
of quality than quantity. The problem is not thow much' but 'in what
way.'
(2) The divergence of aims of private and social (national or public)
investment.
Of course, behind this divergence there is a fundamental fact
concerning the private-property-system which distinguishes capitalism
from socialism. But, here, I would like to take the divergence be-
tween marginal productivity of private investment and that of social
investment. This also means the divergence of 'criteria' in the in-
tention of economic activities between the private entrepreneur and
the national economy as a whole, even though the future efficiency of
investment is sometimes calculated in the same way. This is a prob-
lem of 'choice.' which Marxists call 'anarchism in production.' This
'choice' includes not only the amount of expected interest but also
the rate of interest, the time getting interest and even the concep-
tion of 'interest' itself.
(3) The important relation between investment and economic growth.
This can be explained from two aspects.
One is concerned with the range (term) of investment. There must
be a limit in the investment of private capital, because it may be
several years before recent investment brings returns, and private
capital cannot wait, on account of the lack of forecasting the risks
of investment, and the mobility of capital. This fact is connected
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with recent progress in technology and the indivisibility of equip-
ment which has become larger scale than ever before.
The other is concerned with the fact that the social overhead
cost (capital) which is indispensable to economic growth, especially
in take-off time, has become larger and larger. In this category
we can include the investment not only for railroads, harbours, dam-
building, and farm-irrigation but also that for education and scien-
tific research which perform important roles in technical progress
and in the formation of skills.
I may mention here, that the increase of the proportion which
government investment is of total investment bears a relation to the
fact that the possibility of planning has increased with the growth
of the economy.
Thus, the problem of investment allocation comes out to be a
main part of the economic plan, today. The phases of the problem
are different according to the stage reached in economic growth.
Returning to the new Plan, priority in investment is given to
the heavy and chemical industries as a top-level sector and then to
energy-supply industries and railroad-construction. These sectors
can be said to be 'basic' industries.
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The criteria of investment allocation are considered from the
following aspects:
(1) Internationalism or "Inner-developmentism"?25
The economic plans of post-war Japan had been based on the
recognition of the fact that the Japanese economy has a high propen-
sity to export and import.
It is desirable for certain reasons like the obstacles in the
way of free trade and the low elasticity of income of underdeveloped
countries, which are the main market for Japan, to approach a self-
supporting system as far as possible through the developing or cul-
tivation of domestic natural resources and foods . However, "inner-
developmentism" would be undesirable compared with internationalism,
from the point of view of the many difficulties with which we are now
contending, such as land allocation, the efficiency of capital, trends
in marginal cost, competitative power in foreign markets, the law of
diminishing returns, and so forth.2 6
This means that a high level of exports together with a high
level of imports (not always less-imports) should be the policy with
the highest priority in the development plan. It is more economical
compared with "inner developmentism" and will promote economic growth
more rapidly. This is also reasonable from a historical point of
view.
Of course, these two aspects do not always stand face by face.
There could be a combination-policy such as lightening the export-
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import-ratio ( ) by promoting new
industries like the synthetic fibre industries.
(2) Agriculture or Manufacturing Industries?
In this choice, the latter is usually given preference in the
comparison between internationalsim and autarky, because of funda-
mental criteria like the law of diminishing returns. Furthermore,
the development of the secondary industries. must proceed to supply
the productive-goods necessary to industrialize agriculture and to
absorb into its own sector part of the relatively over-populated labor
force in the primary industries. Of course, equilibrium must be kept
between these two sectors according to the stage of economic growth.27
(3) To which Industry of the Secondary Industries?
In this choice, almost all plans have stressed the industrializa-
tion with heavy and chemical industries (though some more positively
than others). The bases of this industrialization are as follows:
(a) Although "light-industrialism" was a symbol of peace, pre-
war and "heavy and chemical-industrialism" was forced by non-
economic violence in war-time accompanied by high cost, there is
no inevitability in the old pattern. History need not repeat it-
self. On the contrary, we should utilize the 'bequeathed prop-
erty* of the past (facilities, equipment, technology, and skill).
(b) The foreign market for the Japanese textile industry has
entirely changed; namely, sil has lost its American market
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through the progress of synthetic fibres and the collapse of the
mulberry fields during the war; and cotton also lost the greater
part of its foreign market through the progress of textile indus-
tries of the underdeveloped countries and the progress of chemi-
cal textiles, even though it is still powerfully competitive with
foreign textiles.
Thus, this 'lost' part in the export market should be filled
by the heavy and chemical-industries' products.
(c) On the other hand, the demand for heavy and chemical-indus-
tries' goods, such as iron and steel, machinery, chemical ferti-
lizers and medicines in Southeast Asia will increase as their
industrialization progresses, and this corresponds to the pattern
of trade between Southeast Asia and Japan 'material-imports and
manufactured-exports.'
(d) Heavy and chemical-industrialization has the possibility of
making more opportunities of employment, bringing more value
added than light-industrialization. This means will lower the
import-export ratio.
(e) From a historical point of view (though not theoretically
accepted), many advanced countries adopted or are adopting an
economic policy which gives first priority to 'heavy-industry'
as a desirable course of growth.
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However, there are some persistent objections to such 'heavy
and chemical-industrialization,' as follows:
(1) It seems economical to utilize the 'bequeathed property' exter-
nally. But, this property is too old-fashioned to use, and was built
at the sacrifice of 'peace-industries' (the textile industry and the
consumer-goods-industries). Therefore, we have first to restore
light-industry.
This opinion is related to the theory that in the natural course
of economic growth light-industry should develop earlier than heavy
industry.
(2) There still remain sufficient foreign markets for textiles, and
it is not desirable to give them up now. The obstacles now limiting
the markets (import restrictions, high tariffs, etc.) can be enlarged
by diplomatic negotiation.
This opinion is endorsed by the theory that at the first step
of economic development in underdeveloped countries the wages of
workers should be raised as a stimulant to capital formation.
(3) As far as international competitive ability is concerned, our
light-industries (textile and miscellaneous goods) are superior to
heavy and chemical industries in price level, technology, and sell-
ing networks.
(4) Judging from the present stages of capital accumulation in Japan,
rapid heavy and chemical industrialization might cause inflation (with
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or without an increase in the propensity to import). So, it is neces-
sary to accumulate capital in light-industry first, and then shift to
heavy and chemical-industrialization. This would be the most natural
course for economic growth which on the evidence of the history of
capitalism. The history of recent Japan also shows that too rapid
economic growth can raise the capital-coefficient abnormally.
These objections against heavy and chemical-industrialization
come mainly from supporters of the textile industry and some groups
of economists who analyze the pattern of economic growth using some
conceptions of modern economics.
Nevertheless, unless they go to extremes, both aspects can
reasonably be argued. A final decision depends on the policy-maker 's
judgment case by case. From a theoretical point of view, it must be
decided in which way the sum of the following benefits can be maxi-
mized:
(1) the import/export ratio, (2) the rate of material revolution,
(3) the terms of production, (4) the effective-demand ratio in the
world trade component (income elasticity), (5) the export/output
ratio, (6) the productivity of equipment (rate of fixed-capital revo-
lution), (7) the return/output ratio (domestic value added), (8) en-
ergy-ef ficiency.
55
Those criteria mentioned above are economic factors which can be
calculated more or less from economic variables.
But, there are other factors which are non-economic and influence
economic growth to a great extent . The final criteria of allocation
of investment must be in the light of both economic and non-economic
factors.
Thus, in the economic plan of middle-advanced countries, the
decision as to the 'priority industry ' is the most important one,
and this entails at the same time consideration of the criteria of
investment allocation.
3. Non-Economic Factors in Economic Planning.
Most of the economic plans we have had so far in Japan, have
ended in failure, even though some of their final targets were at-
tained within the planned period.
The reasons for failure can be summarized in three categories
as follows:
(1) The international situation of Japanese Economy.
The economic situation of Japan itself is very much influenced
by the changes in the international situation which the Japanese
government can never control. But, paradoxically, it should be one
of the main purposes of economic plans in such countries to prevent
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shocks from international fluctuations and to keep the stability of
the domestic economy.
Almost all the plans settled exports targets as the basic targets
of the plan, but ironically, these targets were the most unstable in
nature, because Japan's position in the export market is that of a
*marginal-supplier2 which is a result of low competitive ability,
lack of systematic markets and her own special pattern of exports
as previously mentioned.2 8
This problem of the international situation is more or less
a political one. It is related to the balance of power between
Western and Eastern bloc, and between the Asian and other 'areas,
the strategic value of Japan, the power of combination in Asia and
so forth.
From this point of view, we can appreciate the fact that the
occupation of Japan by foreign countries or strong restriction by
them did sometimes hinder the ability of the Japanese government to
make an independent plan. Of course, this is merely one phase of this
problem.
(2) The unstability of government and the lack of co-operation of
the people.
The Cabinet of Japan has changed many times since the end of
World War II. These frequent changes of government themselves have
57
been a reason for failure of economic plans. How can one expect
'long-range' plans to outlive these 'short-lived' governments?
Successive governments recognized the necessity of long-term invest-
ments which do not bring immediate returns, but they did not want to
bring forward such proposals because they also knew that such in-
vestments would not be welcomed by the voters. Moreover, sometimes
even the Congressmen (the ministers) opposed or sabotaged co-operation
with planning authorities. This 'unstability* of the political sit-
uation is one of the non-economic factors which has a great effect
on economic growth, though I shall not refer any more to it here.
Sometimes the reason of failure lay on the side of the people
who were unable either psychologically or economically to co-operate
with the plan.
In this respect, there is a dilemma in the execution of any
plan. Economic development requires change, and change is sure to
violate some existing institutions and hence run counter to some
existing emotional current. Two principles of planning, progress
and stability, often run counter to each other.2 9
For example, some labor unions have strongly opposed the 'pro-
ductivity increasing movement' because of lack of social security,
fear of strengthening labor, or 'affection for their workshops.'
Some enterpreneurs act without considering the influences of their
behavior on the national economy. Behind such behaviors, there are
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many other non-economic factors which have been ignored so far, al-
though they have had definite influences on the plan. However, pre-
cise the plan is made theoretically, we can never say it is a 'real
plant if it is not practical.
(3) Misadopting the Theory.
The failures sometimes occurred from misadopting an economic
theory. There is no absolute, universal or 'super-historic' plan
which goes through all times or can be applied to any country. Theory
is, on the contrary, very relative and historical, and must correspond
to the stage of economic growth. An economic model can never be im-
ported directly from any other country.
"Can the methodology of the Indian economic plan be applied di-
rectly to the United States?" "Can the methodology of Vanomie Plan
in Italy be used in Germany?" or "Can we use the methodology of
early-capitalism today?" The answers are definitely 'No.'
Nevertheless, unfortunately, the economists in Japan who have
learned so much from the West have sometimes used the same model in
making an economic plan without 'translating' it into terms appliable
to the stages of economic growth in Japan. Here, we do not deny that
we can learn about or from other countries . However, we should
learn and should translate them, we should not 'copy' or 'imitate'
them.30
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Let me give some examples. The method of projecting the future
desirable GNP in the former plan, The Five Year Plan for Economic
Self-Support (1955), was similar to the so called Colm's Model which
has shown good evidence for long-range economic projections in U.'S.A.
The model itself is very theoretical. As we mentioned before, in
that plan, total GNP was calculated from formula, GNP - m ( rN-U)
(where m stands for out per man, r for the ratio of the labor force
to working age population, N and U for the total number of un-employed).
This formula was the most basic formula of the plan, from which many
other factors were derived.
But, unfortunately, these parameters were all unstable, espe-
cially the natures of r and U which are quite different from those
of advanced countries. For example, r is usually considered to show
downward curve as the standard of living (income per capita) goes up.
This is true in the case of advanced countries, but in Japan, this
showed upward trend empirically, owing to the special features of
Japanese employment. We can say the same thing of U. This figure
itself has little meaning because of disguised unemployment. Here
again, we meet the problem of non-economic factors connected with
economic factors.
We can easily find another example in the field of small- and
medium-scale industries which form a typical pattern or economic
structure. In Japan, there is a trend that the more the economy
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enlarges, the greater the divergence becomes between large and small
scale enterprises. This fact is also a result of the special social
structure of Japan. In Japan, the growth of GNP itself does not al-
ways mean the improvement in the level of small scale industries. On
the contrary, a relatively poor situation in small scale industries
has often supported the rapid growth of the economy as a whole.
Though these factors can be more or less treated by economic theory,
there still remains a strong influence on the economy from non-economic
factors. We can easily discover other examples (such as the relation
between propensity to consume and the insurance-system) of this.
The above mentioned factors which are connected with the 'duality
of the economy' are the 'negative-side' of non-economic factors. These
factors are historically rooted in incomplete take-off in economic
growth or too serious competition with foreign countries, and are
often stimulated by too rapid growth. This is, a reason why the
theory used must correspond to the stage of economic growth.
But there are other kinds of non-economic factor which can be
described as 'positive.' They are 'technical progress' and 'built-
in stabilizers'; the former promotes productivity by changing the pat-
tern of economic growth, and the latter, which is institutional, works
automatically to prevent economic fluctuations.
But I do not want to refer to these factors here other than to
say that they bear an important relation to education, social tradition,
political institutions, public opinion and so forth.3 1
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The Plan, speaking fairly, does not consider these factors very
much, so that the problems are left to economists with an interest in
economic growth theory.
To analyse the relations between economic and non-economic fac-
tors (including 'quantifying the non-quantifiable'), and to find a
proper place for non-economic factors in economic theories, are the
main problems put before us.
4. The Plan as 'Theory' and as 'Policy'
The phrase 'economic plan' can be defined literally as 'A number
of measures and steps to gratify social wants in conscious applica-
tion of objective economic principles.'
Here, two aspects of 'plan' come out; namely plan as a theory,
and as a policy. A 'plan' has not only to have a theory, but also
to be carried out practically on the real stage of national activity.
Turning back to the theoretical side of an economic plan in Japan,
attention should be paid to the particular features of the Japanese
eonomy as a middle-advanced country.
In this context, what shall we do with or how shall we deal with
the present Plan? Firstly, we must realize that economic model build-
ing is only one step in the whole of economic development. At the
same time, we must recognize that the plan is not absolute but rela-
tLve. Some economic parameters may not be stable or constant as in
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advanced countries but may be very unstable and variable. This is
one of the reasons why we should picture the whole structure of the
economy, even when we consider a specific sector or industrial proj-
ect. The only way to make a more useful plan is continued work on
the plan.
Secondly, we must recognize that there are too many dilemmas
in the Japanese economy to adopt the Western theory directly. Gen-
erally speaking, the higher the rate of growth the better the employ-
ment situation. This is, however, not true in the case of Japan. This
kind of dilemma is quite different from any general dilemma of the
capitalistic system, such as 'the better the employment situation is,
the slower the growth of productivity is.'
A short-cut to improvement is the trial-and-error method, because
in .social-science fields the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
Thirdly, there are many unresolved factors to consider in making
a plan for Japan.. One of the possible paths to improvement is not
to attach too much importance to the 'plan,' or to devise ways of
measuring certain phenomena and their causes which seem non-qualiti-
fiable at present, and which are treated merely as non-economic factors.3 2
So far we have referred only to the theoretical side of an eco-
nomic plan. But a plan would be merely a 'game' if it remained there
and were not carried out in practical economic policy; in other words,
whether a plan can succeed or not depends finally upon the government
which makes the plan itself.
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What should the government do? What In the role of any govern-
ment which has the responsibility of executing the plan?
Referring to the role of government, the Plan points out some
efforts which the government should make. The government itself also
issued a statement on the Plan intending to make every possible effort
to accomplish the Plan lest it should be regarded as a mere projection;
in this statement it announces that it will try to prevent excessive
business fluctuations, to undertake necessary reforms in the manage-
ment of the administration for carrying out the Plan and so forth,
using the Plan as a guide.
Let me review this explanation a little more because this state-
ment as it stands is too simple and too general. It is true that in
democratic society there are a few fundamental roles which the govern-
ment must achieve in general. Such objectives as Professor M. Millikan
pointed out may be typical examples.3 3
There should, however, be certain special roles for governments
in middle-advanced countries beside these general fundamental roles,
just as there are some special features in economic plans for these
countries.
In short, the role of the government in middle-advanced countries
should be that of a 'mediator' or 'adjuster,' whereas the role of
underdeveloped countries' government can be described as a 'promoter'
and of advanced countries as 'spectator.'
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In early capitalism or in pure capitalism, the cheaper govern-
ment activity was the better. But in middle-advanced countries like
Japan, if the government stays merely as a 'by-stander' without direct-
ing economic activity at all, or if on the contrary it meddles with
private activities excessively, then the growth of the economy would
be disturbed.
It is difficult, however, to determine the details of govern-
ment's role distinctly, because it must be determined case by case.
For instance, the position of government in a case where progress
stands face to face with the 'status quo, ' is very delicate. The
government must, on the one hand, maintain the stability which often
means keeping the 'status quo, ' and it must also, on the other hand,
lead the economic 'changes' which often violate the 'status quo,'
standing at the head of the nation. As Professor P. Samuelson points
out, progress is an obstreperous and often cruel disturbance of the
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'status quo.' This is especially true in Japan where even a small
'change' arouses a wide resistance or sacrifice, sometimes in or from
'conservatives' and sometimes in or from 'progressives.,35 
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These problems mean, in conclusion, that the final decision as
to whether the plan is good or not, whether it should stay merely as
a 'desirable birds-eye-view in the future' or not, depends on whether
the character of the government reflects public opinion democratically
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or not. This is not only an economic, but also a political and
social problem.
PA!kT II APPENDIXES
I Footnotes
There have been many economic plans given the title 'long-
range' in Japan. It is curious that there have been so many 'long-
range' plans, in the last ten years if we think over the meaning of
the word 'long-range'. Usually in the economic literature, 'long-
range' means that it covers more than a year, and yet we have had a
'llng-range' economic plan almost every year since the end of World
War II. (For example: The Economic Rehabilitation Plan in 1948,
The Ec'nomic Self-supporting Plan in 1950, The Okano Economic Pro-
gram in 1953, The Economic Five Year Plan in 1955, and the New Long-
Range Eco)nomic Plan in 1957, etc.)
Each 'new' plan, in any case, has always had a quite different
character from its predecessor, in other words, these plans bear no
relation to each nther, such as 'the First' 'the Second' 'the Third'
five year plan. The reason for this curious fact in the history of
ecnnomic plan in Japan is nothing but the reason why I am writing
this article.
2 There are many meanings given to the word 'plan.' It is con-
fusedly regarded as -r distinguished from the word 'project(ing)'
'program(ing),' 'economic model (building), ' or even 'forecast(ing). *
I have suggested in my book ("The history and background of economic
plan in Japan" 1957) that the definition of the word must be deter-
mined by historically considering the objectives, targets and measures
of the plan.
Here, guide-p'st nearly means project but not exactly project it-
self. In any case, the definition of the word 'plan' is not so impor-
tant at the present stage. It will become clear as we progress.
11-2
3 The Plan had been originally prepared by the Economic Delibera-
tiqn Council (the advisory organ of the Economic Planning Agency).
which consists of not more than 30 committee members who are appointed
by the Prime Minister from among leading industrial, banking, and
academic experts. The staff of the E.C.A. together with the economists
of the University of Hitotsubash have cooperated with the I.D.C. As
far as the planning system is concerned, it is democratic.
4 See OEEC report, "The European Economy in 1965" (1957).
5
'Realization of full employment" was one of the main targets
in the last plan, 'The Five Year Plan for Economic Self-Support' (1955).
Considering the peculiar features of the employment situation in Japan,
the makers of the present Plan decided not to use the word "full
employment".
6As for example, see the Economic Planning Agency, "Economic
Survey in 1956" (1957, Japan).
7
See Gerhard Colm, "The American Economy in 1960" (1952).
8
See Shigeto Tsurn, "Empirical testing of macro-economic planning
in Japan" (1957). In this article, Professo; Tsurn criticizes the
former Plan not only from a theoretical but also from an empirical
point of view.
9See Kazushi Okawa, "The Conditions of the Optimum Growth Rate"
(The Economic Research, October 1957, Tokyo).
10Professor Woytinsky's informal opinions on the Japanese Economy.
(January 14, 1956, at Tokyo).
11Production figures are shown in output quantity, that is to say
in the production index. Then it is corrected into gross production
income. In this procedure, there are two unresolved problems. One
is a difficulty in the index itself, and the other is the relation
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between the production-index and gross product in money terms, which
is in effect the problem of W/g rate, where n stands for not production
and K stands for gross production. There seems to be no absolute way
of overcoming the former except the present expedient; it would, how-
ever, be possible to induce a relative relation between the two
factors, in the latter case, by empirical judgment. For instance,
the assumed relation between GNP and national income in the Plan is as
follows; "although the rate of depreciation will increase slightly,
parallel with the increase in investment, the proportion of the othor
adjusting item will decrease, so the national income will increase
at the same rate as GNP.
12There are many definitions of or ways of arriving at the capi-
tal-output ratio. For instance, (1) I has not to include investment
for inventories, (2) increase has to mean net increase but not gross
increase, (3) there must be one, or at least half a year's time-lag
between I and 0, and so forth. All kinds of computations are tried
as possiblilities, but there still remains a question to be discussed.
The adoption of this ratio must be carefully carried out. See S.
Tsurn, 'Empirical Testing of the Macro-economic planning in Japan'
(1957) and Francis M. Bator, 'On Capital productivity, imput alloca-
tion and growth' (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1957).
13 It seems too simple to say that the capital-output ratio in
underdeveloped countries has a tendency to go up as industrialization
proceeds, or, on the contrary, to say that the ratio in advanced
countries has a tendency to decrease because of the high productivity
of capital. We must consider the question in the light both of labor-
reliance and of the rate of capital-output. This will be more role-
vant for international comparisons. Anyhow, the movement or stability
of this ratio depends on the stage of economic growth, and this is the
reason why we are examining the ratio by industrial sectors.
11-4
14 See the Economic Planning Agency of Japan, "Economic Survey of
Japan (1956-1957)" (August 1957).
1 5See. S. Tsurn, "Empirical testing of the Macro-economic plan-
ning in Japan" (1957), and Francis M. Bator, "On Capital productivity.,
input allocation and growth" (Q.J.E., February 1957).
1 6The effort to improve the input-output study and to apply it in
economic model building has been ceaseless in Japan, but there still
remains some questions about its use at the present stage of the study.
On this, see S. Shishido, "On criteria of Japanese Input-output Table"
(1957, Stanford University).
17
Professor K. Okawa. has pointed out that if the rate of economic
growth is considered to be 2.0 or 2.5 per cent higher, then the pro-
pensity to import must be estimated to be 1.5 or 2.0 per cent higher.
See, K. Okawa, -"The conditions of optimum growth rate" (1957).
18
See S. Tsurn, "Empirical testing of macro-economic planning
in Japan" (1957). On the subject of the relation between employment
and economic growth in Japan, see the Economic Planning Agency, "Eco-
nomic Survey of Japan (1956-1957)" and Miyohei Shinohava, "Industrial
structure and investment allocation" (the Japanese Economic Research,
October 1957).
1 9Here, I use the word 'plan' in its widest meaning with less
theoretical examination. I include in 'plan' such conceptions as
'program(-ing)', 'project(-ing)', 'scheme*, 'future-model(-building)',
'plan(-ing)', and 'long-range forecast(-ing)', and so on.
20
Besides these four categories, there is another type of economic
plan which is rather international.. For example, the co-ordinate eco-
nomic plan among the communist countries, the co-ordinate plan between
advance and underdeveloped countries (such as the Colombo-Plan, the
Marshall-Plan, etc.) and the co-ordinate works between or among the
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countries with equal right-and-responsibility, (such as Energy Project
for the future 20 years by OEEC).
These wide-spread international economic plans will become more
and more necessary to promote effectively the economic plans of the
participants.
21This does not mean, however, that there is nothing valuable
in the economic planning of these socialistic countries. On the con-
trary, I believe, there is much to be learned from them as well in
natural scientific fields. But, it requires even more careful and
faithful study to make the problem clear, so that it is better to
discuss it separately.
22
As Professor P. Rosenstein-Rodan adequately pointed out in
his lecture, 'The Theory of Economic Growth' (1957-1958, MIT), one
serious, but often over-looked fault in investment plans is in misw
valued exchange rate of currency, which has an immediate relation
to cost-calculation about new equipment or machinery mainly expected
to be imported from outside.
23 See S. Tsurn, "Empirical Testing of the Macro-economic Planning
in Japan' (Economic Research, Tokyo, 1958) and also, I. Miyazaki, 'His-
torical Backgrounds of Economic Planning in Japan' (The Oriental Eco-
nomist, Japan 1957).
2 4See, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Programming in theory and in
Italian Practice" ('Investment Criteria and Economic Growth', Center
for Internation Studies, MIT, 1955). In his lecture, 'The theory of
economic growth' (1957-1958), he supplemented this theory by the
experiences of the Italian Plan and others.
2 5Though I say the control over import-export field is passive,
it does not mean, by any means, that the role of exports and imports
in maximizing the national income has little importance. Whether
the Plan can succeed or not depends very much on whether the export-
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import targets can be attained. The main policy to increase exports
is to modernize the domestic incustries, which is related to the prob-
lem of investment allocation, though there are still many supplementary
policies such as export-or-import subsidies, the presentation of over-
competition, the reduction of taxes, and enlightenment movement and so
on. Also, the role of imports can be taken as one aspect of $the
allocation of investment', though it is not directly related to invest-
ment.
There are three types of foreign trade control, namely (1) tariffs,
(2) export-import control and (3) changing exchange rate.
I will refer to (1) and (2) later, and will avoid tackling the problem
of (3) directly, referring to it only as far as the matter of invest-
ment allocation is concerned. The change of the exchage rate occurs
in case (1) when the international balance became so bad that even powe-
ful dis-inflation cannot remedy it, and (2) when the domestic price
and cost structure show quite different patterns from the international
standard. The accumulation of foreign exchange, which is one of the
targets in the trade program, is also related to the problem of invest-
ment allocation.
26 Many economists in Japan regard the "narrowness of land (terri-
tory) and surplus population" as a basic ground for Internationalism.
But I disagree with this view. The influence of population on the
national economy is by no means absolute but is relative and variable
according to productivity. (Even the law of diminishing return is not
decisive.) This is tested not only historically but theoretically by
Professor E. Hagen.
If we agree with the general vulgar view on Internationalism,
we will have, at the same, a dangerous chance to be a 'colonialist'.
2 7In this part of the article, I use a word 'Inner-developmentism,
in a narrow sense, namely as a conception like a self-supplied and
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self-sustained type of economy (like 'autarky') as usually used. But,
if we regard Inner-developmentism as something like deepening-ism
(U.S. to widening-isam) or developentism in domestic market, we must
revise our view. In such a case, the problem is concerned with the
wage level, standards of living technical progrees and so forth and
does not stand face to face with Internationalism.
28,As Professor C.P. Kindlebergor pointed out in his "Dollar
Shortage", instability of plan in an open-system can be prenested by
due judgement of international fluctuations.
2 9 See, E.E. Hagen, "The Allocation of Investment in Underdeveloped
Countries ."
30Similar thing has happened in the case of the Indian Plan.
See, W. Malenbaum, "Who does the Planning?" (November 1956).
31When we say non-economic factors, it includes a wide range and
means psychological, social and political factors as causal in economic
growth, such as interrelations between personality characteristics,
systems of belief, social structure, and in other words, motivation,
value, 'world view', traditionalism, religion,nationalism, kinship
structure, class structure, legal system, political system, communica-
tion patterns, etc.
32See, E. Hagen, "The role of Economic Forecasting in Income
Stabilization" (Ed. by M. Millikan, 'Income Stabilization for A
Developing Democracy--1953, Yale.)
33 See, M. Millikan, 'Objectives for Economic Policy in a Democracy*
(Ed. by him 'Income Stabilization for a Developing Democracy--1963, Yale.)
34See, Paul Samuelson, "Full employment versus Progress and
other Economic Goals" (in Millikan ed. book, 1953).
35This does not mean that a government should be 'neutral' in
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certain cases. As Professor Rosenstein-odan says, 'Neutral govern-
ment is as unrealistic an assumption as neutral money.'
36The following policies can be regarded as the 'general' role
of the government in Japan:
(a) to maintain economic stability; By 'economic stability, we mean
(1) the absence of fluctuations upward or downward in total employ-
ment (2) absence of mass or disguised unemployment (3) the absence
of excessive price inflation, resulting from imbalance in the inter-
national balance of payments or from excessive demand for capital or
from the appearance of 'bottleneck" industry or sometimes from
unexpected causes such as war or emergency affairs in international
balance of power.
(b) to consolidate statistics or other data which help the planners.
(c) to co-operate with foreign countries to draw up mutual assistance
plans.
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Table 1
PRINCIPLE ECONOMIC INDICES
Fiscal 1956
Actual Base
Item Unit Figures Value 1962 C/A C/B
(A) (B) (C) (%) (%)
*100 (5.8) (6.5)
Gross National Product million 92,878 89,396 130,440 140.4 145.9
(5.8) (6.5)
National Income " 76,855 73,841 107,720 140.2 145.9
(0.8)
Total Population 10,000 9,025 - 9,459 104.8 -
15-59 years (1.9)
Working-Age Population of age 5,326 - 5,956 111.9 -
(4.2)
Employment " 1,787 - 2,285 127.9 -
(5.5)
Personal Consumption yen 60,010 - 82,740 138.0 -
(per capita)
(8.2)
Industrial Activity 1934-36 - 100 231.7 - 371.9 160.5 -
(7.7)
Total Energy Demand 1,000 tons 103,880 - 160,600 156.2 -
(10.0)
Exports $1 million 2,495 - 4,422 177.2 -
(5.6)
Imports " 3,050 - 4,230 138.7 -
Note: C/A C/B figures in parentheses indicate annual rates.
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Table 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1956
Actual Base
Item Figures Value 1962 C/A C/B
(A) (B) (C) (%) (%)
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (5.8) (6.5)
Domestic National Income 77,180 74,136 108,110 140.1 145.8
(18.5) (19.1) (15.7) (2.9) (3.0)
Primary Industry 14,242 14,186 16,940 118.9 119.4
(42.3) (41.8) (43.6) (6.3) (7.2)
Secondary Industry 32,637 31,019 47,170 144.5 152.1
(39.3) (39.0) (40.7) (6.4) (7.2)
Tertiary Industry 30,301 28,931 44,000 145.2 152.1
Net Income from Overseas - 325 -295 - 370
(5.8) (6.5)
National Income 76,855 73,841 107,740 140.2 145.9
Adjustment Items, Etc. 16,023 15,555 22,700
(5.8) (6.5)
Gross National Product 92,878 89,396 130,440 140.4 145.9
Unit:
Note:
i100 million in 1956 prices.
The figures in the parentheses under (A), (B), and (C) indicate composite
ratios.
Figures in parentheses under C/A and C/B indicate annual rates.
(The Secondary Industries in the Plan include transportation, communications,
and public utilities.)
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Table 3
GROSS NATIONAL EXPENDITURES
1955 1956 1962 C/B C/A
(A) (B) (C) (S) (%)
Gross Consumption Expenditures
Personal Consumption Exp.
(71.7)
62,130
(69.4)
64,443
(60.7) (58.3)
52,711 54,155
(70.0)
91,300
(6.0)
141.7
(5.7)
147.0
(60.0) (6.3) (5.8)
78,260 144.5 148.5
(11.0)
Government Outlays 9,419
Gross Capital Formation
Equipment Investment
Industrial Equipment
Primary Industry
Secondary Industry
Tertiary Industry
Administrative Investment
Inventory Increase (and
Decrease)
Personal Housing Construction
Overseas Surplus on Current Accounts
Gross National Expenditures
(11.1)
10,288
(25.6) (31.6)
21,864 29,367
(16.8) (21.8)
14,332 20,279
(11.8)
10,092
(1.8)
1,509
(17.5)
16,262
(2.1)
1,969
(8.5) (13.0)
7,290 12,059
(1.5)
1,293
(5.0)
4,241
(7.1)
6,057
(1.7)
1,475
(1.7)
1,467
(2.4)
2,234
(4.3)
4,017
(8.0)
7,407
(1.8)
1,690
(-1.0)
-901
(10.0)
13,040
(28.5)
37,180
(4.0)
126.8
(4.0)
126.5
(21.0) (5.2)
27,390 125.4
(4.8)
138.5
(7.9)
170.0
(7.9)
191.1
(15.8) (4.0) (10.7)
20,610 126.7 204.2
(1.9)
2,480
(12.2)-
15,910
(1.7)
2,220
(5.2)
6,780
(5.5)
7,180
(2.0)
2,610
(1.5)
1,960
(3.9) (7.3)
125.9 164.2
(4.7)
132.0
(11.8)
218.3
(- ) (8.0)
99.2 171.5
(9.2)
169.3
(6.9)
159.9
(- ) (2.4)
96.9 118.4
(7.5) (8.5)
154.4 176.9
- (4.2)
- 133.7
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (5.8) (6.2)
85,462 92,878 130,440 140.4 152.6
table.
Note: unit $100 million in 1956 prices.
Figures in the parentheses are as 'Gross National Production'
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Table 4
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCE
195
Gross savings
Depreciation allowance
Corporation reserve
Private savings
Government budget surplus
(Errors and ommissions)
Gross investments
International account balance
22,818
6,570
2,842
9,344
3,112
950
1956
28,071
7,631
4,563
12,242
3,819
-184
21,864 29,376
954 -1,305
Note: X100 million in 1956 prices.
Table 5
BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS ($1 million)
1955 1956 1962 B/A
(A) (B) M%
Receipts 2,839 3,337 5,080 152.2
Exports 2,095 2,495 4,422 177.2
Invisible 145 842 658 78.1
Ordinary 175 255 408 160.0
Special Procurements 570 587 250 42.6
Payments 2,513 3,566 4,930 138.3
Imports 2,165 3,050 4,230 138.6
Invisible 348 516 700 135.6
Real Balance 327 -229 150
Adjustment Items 59 267 89
Nominal Balance 386 38 239
1962
38,930
11,220
6,000
17,020
4,690
37,180
1,750
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Table 6
PROPENSITY TO IMPORTS
1955
1956
1962
Calculated by
13.8
16.9
16.2
custom
clearance
amount of imports \ base / 1
National Income
Table 7
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
1955
Heavy Chemical Industries
Light Industries
Total
55.42
44.58
100.00
1956
58.71
41.29
100.00
Table 8
RATIO OF M1PORTED RATIO (per cent)
1934-1936
1955
1956
1962
1975
18 per cent
21 per cent
23 per cent
33 per cent
48 per cent (estimation)
1962
65.56
34.44
100000
Table 9
EMPIDYM1T STRUCTURE (per cent)
Industry-by-Industry workers
Total
Primary industry
Secondary industry
Tertiary industry
Status-by-Status workers
Self-employed
Employes
Family workers
1956
100.0
40.7
28.7
30.6
25,6
42.0
32.4
1962
100.0
35.7
29.9
34.4
24.3
49.5
26.2
Table 10
CHANGE OF THE CONSUMPTION STRUCTURE
Growth rate
1956 1962 196X 956
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Food stuffs 46.5 49.2 39.7 43.7 113.5 111.9
Staple foods 15.5 22.7 11.2 17.3 98.6 99.2
Others 31.0 26.5 28.5 26.4 125.3 129.9
Clothing 12.6 10.5 14.3 11.7 154.9 145.8
Heat, light 5.1 4.4 5.0 3.3 133.8 94.9
Housing 7.0 11.8 8.4 13.7 162.3 141.1
Others 28.8 20.0 32.6 24.3 154.3 160.2
Temporary expense 4.1 - 4.1 - 131.8
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Table 11
RATIO TO WORD'S TRADE
Exports Imports
1938 5.4 4.6
1954 2.1 3.0
1955 2.4 2.8
1956 2.7 3.8
Sources: Prewar figures: U. N. trade statistical yearbook.
Postwar figures: I. M. F. statistics.
Table 12
IMPORT-EXPORT RATIO OF PRINCIPAL EXPORT GOODS
(per cent in 1956)
Canned tuna 97.7 Ordinary rolled steel 73.0
Glutanic acid soda 64.0 Ships 89.5
Woolen yarn 56.6 Household sewing mach. 96.6
Staple fiber yarn 94.7 Automobile tires 59.0
Cotton yarn 58.6 Cement 99.5
Woolen fabrics 62.0 Lam. plywood 53.7
Cotton staple fibre 96.3 Electric lamps 97.2
Cotton fabrics 59.5 Metal toys 96.4
Note: This means foreign-currency earning ratio which is the ratio of the
net foreign currency income (the export price minus the imported raw
material price) to the export price.
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Table 13
RATIO OF INCREASE IN WORLD DEMAND BY COMMODITIES (per cent)
1951-1955
Ratio of Japan Rate of
exports in 1951-1956 increase
world Demand in Japan
market increase exports
Japan's relatively superior industries
Cotton cloth 28 -41 -26
Clothing 24 +19 +208
Other fabrics 21 -9 +83
Cement 16 +10 +49
Chemical fertilizer 14 +88 +969
ships 13 +87 +502
Japan's relatively medium industries
Iron and steel 10 +36 +26
Miscellaneous goods 10 +8 +127
Physical and chemical appliances, cameras 7 +52 +162
Rolling stock 6 +49 +704
Footwear 6 +25 +72
Bicycles 5 +9 +21
Japan's relatively inferior industries
General industrial machinery 2.8 +3 +87
Timepieces 2.2 +55 +13
Electrical machinery and apparatus 1.6 +48 +105
Films 1.1 +45 +67
Motor (excludes electro-motor) 0.9 +36 -50
Agricultural machinery 0.6 -1 +133
Metal processing machinery 0.6 +28 +89
Automobiles 0.3 +37 +236
Source: Economic Survey of Japan (1956-1957)
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Table 14
EXPORTS TO ADVANCED AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (per cent)
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
To advanced countries 29.3 23.9 29.0 24.0 23.6 28.9 29.5
To underdeveloped countries 70.7 76.1 71.0 76.0 76.4 71.1 70.5
Note: Advanced countries include U.S.A., U.K., Germany, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxemberg.
Table 15
COMPARISON OF RCUCTS OF INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE LABOR (per cent)
1934-1936 1951 1956
Intensive labor products 62 55 52
Extensive labor products 21 39 44
Others 17 6 4
Total 100 100 100
Note: Intensive labor product--Foods, textile (excluding artificial fiber goods,
furniture and fixture, precision machinery, leather, wooden work, and
sundries.
Extensive labor product--Chemical manufactures, coal and petroleum products,
metal, machinery, paper goods, glass products.
Others--Raw material, mineral fuels, specially treated goods.
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Table 16
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
(a) Composition of numbers of establishments, employee,
and shipments by alze, of establishment (per cent).
Less 300
than or
1-29 3-99 100-299 300 more
workers workers workers workers workers Total
All industries:*
Establishments 98.0 1.6 0.3 99.9 0.1 100
Workers 61.2 14.7 8.0 83.9 16.1 100
Manufacturing industries:
Establishments 93.7 4.9 1.0 99.6 0.4 100
Workers 41.5 18.7 12.9 73.1 26.9 100
Shipments 22.2 17.0 16.9 56.1 43.9 100
*
Excluding agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.
. ~~0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 a 0 a 0 0 0 a 0 a 0 0 0 0 0
(b) International comparison in total industrial employment
by scale of industries (per cent).
1,000 or
1-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-999 more
workers workers workers workers workers workers Total
Japan (1955) 33.6 17.0 9.6 8.2 17.1b/ 14.6 100
U.S.A. (1947) 7.2 897 9.1 15.6- 26.6- 32.8 100
U.K. (1949) 5.0 11:32- 10.l' 13.0 32.5 28.1 100
a/ 100-249
b/ 250-999
c/ 1-10
d/ 11-49
0 0~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(c) Employment structure by industries (per cent).
1955 1956
Modernized industries 17.6 22.4
Intermediate 19.7 18.0
Pre-condition " 62.7 59.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Note: Definition for stages of modernization are determined by the percentage
of workers among the engaged in the industry.
OW
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Table 17
MARGINAL CAPITAL 00-EFFICIENT
1952 1953 194 1955 Average
Primary Industry 1.6 3.7 3.9 1.3 2.6
Secondary Industry 2.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.2
Tertiary Industry 1.6 0.8 2.7 1.2 1.6
All Industry 2.0 2.1 3.7 1.9 2.4
Administrative Sectors 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6
Total 2.2 2.7 4.3 2.8 3.0
Note: Ratio between total capital formation (including inventory) and
marginal increase of income (gross for same years).
P.
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ECONOMIC DEVEIDPMENT PLAN IN VARIOUS COUNTR IES
Countries
(Asia)
India
China (Formosa)
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaya and
Singapore
Thailand
Burma
Ceylon
Pakistan
Vietnam
Laos
Cambodia
Nepal
Title of Plan
Second Five Year Plan
Economic Construction Four
Year Plan
Five Year Economic and
Social Development Program
Framework of the Five Year
Development Plan
New Five Year Development
Plan
State Welfare Program
Six Year Programme of
Investment
The First Five Year Plan
Two Years Rehabilitation
Plan
Five Year Economic Plan
Two Year State-Construction
Plan
Five Year Economic Plan
Term
1956-1961
1953-1956
1957-1961
1956-1960
1955-1959
1952-1953
1959-1960
1954/55 -
1959/60
1955-1960
1954/55 -
1955/56
1953-1957
1956-1957
Note
Over-all developing
plan.
Industrialization and
self-sustained plan by
the help of U.S.
Six per cent annual in-
crease in N.I. Revolv-
ing-type plan.
Shows the basic direc-
tion of development.
By recommendation of
World Bank.
Specialized programs for
road-construction, rail-
way, harbor, irrigation.
So-called 'Pyidawtha
Program.' Beside this,
practical four-year pro-
gram.
Doubling of per capita
national income.
Twenty per cent increase
in N.I. Development Plan.
Now setting new plan.
Now setting new plan.
(Mainly is agriculture
and transportation.)
Setting new five year
plan.
Investments 44 million
dollars.
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ECONOMIC DEVEIPMENT PLAN IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES (Continued)
Countries-
Afghanistan
Iran
Title of Plan
the second Five Year Plan
the second Seven Year
Development Program
Term
1955-1961
Korea
Okinawa
Japan
(Europe)
France
Italy
New Long-Range Economic Plan 1957-1962
the second Modernization
Plan
Plan for the Development
of Employment and Income
1954-1957
1957-1961
1955-1964
United Kingdom
Note
Mainly for agriculture
and public utilities.
Now preparing by Masen
recommendation.
Now preparing.
Over-all developing
plan (announced Decem-
ber 1957).
Modernization of in-
dustrial equipment--
so-called Monet Plan (1),
Irsh Plan (2).
And now preparing the
third plan.
Increase employment and
development of Southern
Italy--so-called Vanoni
Plan.
Annual project. Local
program under "The Dis-
tribution of Industry
Act."
(Others) in Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and etc. have no Development
Plan but make annual project in budget-season.
(Africa)
(America)
U. S. A.
Ten Year Development Plan Include development Plan
in Sahara.
Annual project under
'Employment Act.* Beside
this, Parrey Report, TVA.
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ECONOMIC DEVEIDPMENT PLAN IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES (Continued)
Countries
Brazil
Title of Plan
Amazon Development Five Year
Plan
Sanfransisio Valley Develop-
ment Plan
Colombia
Venezuela
Program for irrigation,
railway, iron-steel fac-
tory, and tourist indus-
try.
(Communist Countries)
U. S. S. R. the
East Germany the
Poland the
Czechoslovakia the
Hungary the
Romania the
Bulgaria the
Albania the
Communist China the
Mongolia
North Korea
sixth Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
second Five Year Plan
first Five Year Plan
the second Five Year Plan
the first Five Year Plan
1956-1960
1956-1960
1956-1960
1956-1960
1956-1960
1956-1960
1956-1960
1956-1960
1953-1957
1953-1957
1957-1961
Revised.
Revised.
Now in the second Five
Year Plan.
(International)
OZEC Program (Marshal Plan)
Colombo Plan
Term Note
